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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Despite  widespread  faith  that  quality  indicators  are  key  to  healthcare  improvement  and  regulation,  sur-
prisingly  little  is known  about  what  is  actually  measured  in different  countries,  nor how,  nor  why.
To  address  that  gap, this  article  compares  the  official  indicator  sets–comprising  some  1100  quality
measures–  used  by  statutory  hospital  regulators  in England,  Germany,  France,  and  the  Netherlands.  The
findings  demonstrate  that  those  countries’  regulators  strike  very  different  balances  in: the dimensions  of
quality  they  assess  (e.g. between  safety,  effectiveness,  and  patient-centredness);  the  hospital  activities
they  target  (e.g. between  clinical  and  non-clinical  activities  and  management);  and  the  ‘Donabedian’  mea-
surement  style  of  their  indicators  (between  structure,  process  and  outcome  indicators).  We  argue  that
these  contrasts  reflect:  i) how  the  distinctive  problems  facing  each  country’s  healthcare  system  createomparative health policy different  ‘demand-side’  pressures  on  what  national  indicator  sets  measure;  and  ii) how  the  configuration
of  national  healthcare  systems  and governance  traditions  create  ‘supply-side’  constraints  on the  kinds
of  data  that regulators  can  use  for  indicator  construction.  Our analysis  suggests  fundamental  differences
in  the  meaning  of quality  and  its  measurement  across  countries  that  are  likely  to  impede  international
lity  a
ublisefforts  to benchmark  qua
©  2020  The  Authors.  P
. Introduction
Lord Kelvin [1] famously opined that only “when you can mea-
ure what you are speaking about and express it in numbers” can
ou “know something about it”. No doubt he would have applauded
ow healthcare quality, long regarded as too ineffable to define
2], is now subject to pervasive measurement to support every-
hing from quality assurance and improvement to patient choice
nd payment by results. Indeed, quantitative indicators are now
entral to an international ‘quality movement’ [3–7], which has
merged over the last 25 years in response to spiralling costs, safety
candals and demands for more responsive and accessible care. In
ngland’s National Health Service (NHS) for example, the number
f performance indicators has skyrocketed from 70 in 1982 to more
han 2000 today [8,9]. Likewise in the US the number of healthcare
uality indicators endorsed by the National Quality Forum has more
han doubled over the last decade to 1078 [10,11].
Measurement may  be the first step to improvement [12], but the
roliferation of indicators creates its own problems. For one thing,
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measurement and reporting are costly [10], with one recent study
estimating the burden on a major US medical centre at 1% of total
revenue [13], despite efforts to rationalise and reduce excessive
reporting [4,14]. In turn, there are many competing ways of con-
ceptualizing and measuring quality and of selecting, normalising,
aggregating, and visualising quality indicators [15–19]. This cre-
ates difficulties in benchmarking performance– both of individual
providers [20–23] and entire healthcare systems [24–26] —and can
lead to poor choices by patients, policymakers, and practitioners
alike [27].
To improve the consistency, reliability, and validity of care
quality metrics, the World Health Organization, European Commis-
sion, OECD, and Institute of Medicine have published alternative
frameworks for defining key indicator sets [10,28–30]. Indeed, the
European Commission regards the development of comparable
national indicator sets as vital to helping patients exercise their
rights to accessing cross-border healthcare (2011/24/EU). How-
ever, despite efforts to create universal indicators that could help
facilitate convergence and discourage countries from steering by
their own  lights [31,32], high-level international comparative stud-
ies have tentatively pointed to considerable unevenness in the
selection and use of indicators across countries [7].
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Part of the problem is that international frameworks tend to
egard care quality as an objective phenomenon for which univer-
ally applicable measures can—and should– be adopted regardless
f the institutional contexts and purposes for which it is being
ssessed. Yet, as Pollitt et al. [8] have observed in relation to the
eneral measurement of healthcare system performance, patterns
f indicator adoption and use can depend on the distinctive prob-
ems facing different countries’ healthcare systems and governance
raditions. For example, Pollitt et al. [8] suggest that governments
ithin pluralist political systems face fewer institutional con-
traints than governments in corporatist political systems built
n compromise among the social partners. Certainly, a number of
igh-level cross-national comparisons have pointed to distinctive
ational variation in the philosophies and regulatory mandates that
nderpin indicator use as well as the sources on which indicator
ets draw and the purposes to which they are put [33–36].
Beyond high-level observation, however, little is known about
nternational variation in what actually gets measured and how,
hether there are any distinctive patterns to that variation, and
hat might explain such variation. In order to address those lacu-
ae, we undertake the first indicator-by-indicator comparison of
he official sets used across advanced healthcare systems, exam-
ning four neighbouring EU countries: England, Germany, France
nd the Netherlands. We  focus on the statutory regulation of
cute hospital care because that is the area of healthcare provision
here international efforts to define and measure quality are most
dvanced. In so doing, we consider whether and how the availabil-
ty, design, and selection of quality measures vary and what those
atterns reveal about regulatory priorities, institutional barriers
o quality monitoring, and fundamental understandings of quality
tself. We  conclude by reflecting on the opportunities for, and bar-
iers to, future convergence, and on ways to construct meaningful
omparison across countries.
. Methods
Our qualitative study collected and classified the indicators used
y regulatory agencies in a sample of European countries to monitor
he quality of hospital care in their jurisdictions.
.1. Sample
We  selected England, Germany, France, and the Netherlands;
our neighbouring EU member states with advanced economies
nd similarly well-developed but differently structured systems of
ealthcare and varied governance traditions [37]. Their contrasting
rganisation of payers and providers within their respective health-
are systems and their distinctive regulatory arrangements might
e expected to offer different opportunities for indicator construc-
ion and create different demands for quality measures. At the same
ime, all four countries have participated in the OECD Healthcare
ndicators project [6,28] and initiatives by the World Health Orga-
ization [38] and EU [39] to develop standardised quality measures
f international health system effectiveness. There are, therefore,
ood institutional reasons to expect convergence beyond the uni-
ersal desire to follow best practice in quality measurement.
International comparisons of how regulators in different coun-
ries monitor healthcare quality pose considerable methodological
ifficulties, not least because regulators often operate within com-
lex and nationally distinctive landscapes of state and non-state
rganisations, such as medical professional associations, clinical
isease registries, and insurers that have developed their own
ealthcare quality indicators for overlapping or different purposes
40]. In this paper, however, we address that problem of compari-
on by restricting our analysis to the official indicator sets used bylicy 124 (2020) 501–510
the supervisory organisations charged by law with monitoring the
quality of acute hospital healthcare in each country:
• England: Hospital care is almost entirely provided by the single-
payer state-run NHS. Healthcare quality is overseen by the Care
Quality Commission (CQC), which is a non-departmental public
body responsible for regulating the quality of care by all health
and social care providers. As well as licencing and inspecting
providers, the CQC can issue regulatory improvement notices
and put the management of poor quality hospitals into ‘special
measures’ [41]. Its enforcement activities are based on inspection
findings and analysis of the wealth of performance data routinely
collected by NHS England and the Department of Health to inform
the administration and financing of the NHS.
• Germany: Hospital care is delivered by public and private
providers funded by para-public social insurance funds. Health-
care quality is overseen by the Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss
(G-BA), which is a Federal joint committee of medical pro-
fessionals, social insurers, and healthcare providers operating
independently of the Ministry of Health. The G-BA sets and
monitors quality standards and determines which procedures
and providers are eligible for reimbursement. The G-BA also
works collaboratively to design quality indicators that draw on
hospital quality assurance data collected and published by exter-
nal contractors, which the G-BA uses to engage in ‘structured
dialogue’ with providers if their performance deviates from pre-
determined norms.
• France: Hospital care is likewise delivered by public and private
providers largely funded by social insurance funds. Healthcare
quality is overseen by the Haute Autorité de Santé (HAS), which is
an independent administrative authority responsible for accred-
iting and certifying the quality of care provided by hospitals,
clinics, and other health care facilities. HAS designs indicators
in consultation with voluntary and independent health profes-
sionals and patients, conducts peer review visits of hospitals on
a routine basis, collects data, and publishes assessment results
online. Enforcement is left to regional health agencies, which
were given responsibility for health and social care planning, reg-
ulation, and enforcement of national health policy priorities by
the devolution laws of 2009.
• The Netherlands: Hospital care is delivered mostly by private
not-for-profit foundations, which have been funded through
mandatory, and strictly regulated, private insurance since 2006
[42]. Healthcare quality is overseen by the Inspectie Gezondhei-
dszorg en Jeugd (IGJ), which is a government inspectorate within
the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, responsible for reg-
ulating the quality of health and social care, as well as youth
services, and ensuring a level-playing field among providers. The
IGJ executes those tasks by licencing, inspecting, and policing hos-
pitals, using a pyramid of compliance tools and sanctions. The IGJ
also publishes measures of the quality of care delivered by every
Dutch hospital, based on hospital-reported data and indicators
designed in collaboration with medical professional organiza-
tions and the hospital themselves.
2.2. Indicator definition and data sources
We  define an indicator as a discrete variable providing some
nominal, ordinal, or quantitative measure of healthcare quality.
Indicators can either be a single measure, such as the number of
‘never events’ recorded in English hospitals (STEISNE in [43]), or
they can combine multiple measures into a ‘composite indicator’,
such as the French indicator for the quality of discharge records for
psychiatric patients (TDP2 PSY in [44]) which aggregates together
15 discrete fields of information (TDP2 PSY1-15 in [44]).
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Table  1
Conceptual categories for classifying each indicator in terms of its Donabedian style of measurement; the dimensions of quality it assesses; and hospital activities it oversees.
Donabedian style of quality measurement Dimensions of quality Hospital department or activity
Outcome: the effect of care on the
health status and/or satisfaction of
the patient with their treatment
Process:  how healthcare is delivered
Structure:  type and amount of
financial, human, material or
organisational resources used by a
health care organization to deliver
services
Safety: preventing adverse outcomes for patients arising from
care intended to help them
Effectiveness:  efficacy of care in benefitting those who need it
while avoiding unnecessary treatment
Patient-centredness:  responsiveness of care to patient values,
preferences, and needs
Timeliness:  delays and other barriers in accessing appropriate
care
Efficiency:  cost-effectiveness and productivity of providers in
delivering care
Equity: fairness and impartiality in healthcare distribution,
delivery, and outcomes
Well documented: accuracy, completeness, & security of
administrative record-keeping about patients and their care


















Other medical depts: clinical specialties unique to
an indicator set with ≤5 indicators
(e.g. dermatology)
Hospital-wide: indicators for clinical activities




































In 2016 we compiled a database of the hospital quality indica-
ors used at that time by our four supervisory agencies [43–46].
here indicator lists were published in English, as they were
or Germany [45] and England [43], we used those; otherwise
e worked with the original listings in Dutch [46] and French
44] and drew on a corpus of 32 background interviews con-
ucted with key informants from the four countries to clarify any
ncertainties about particular indicators and help explain differ-
nces in indicator selection and use between countries. To ensure
onsistency and capture the variety and granularity of quality mea-
ures, we decomposed ‘composite’ indicators into their constitutive
sub-indicators’. In the process we excluded purely administra-
ive measures used to facilitate data collection, e.g. the Dutch
easure “Does your hospital perform colorectal surgery?” (17.2.2
n [46]), or enable cross-tabulation of patient survey results by
atient condition, e.g. the French measure “did you need help with
outine activities (washing, dressing, eating, . . .)?” (E-SATIS20 in
44]).
In total, our dataset of disaggregated indicators comprises 1,100
ndicators: England 226; Germany 431; France 260; Netherlands
83.
.3. Conceptual framework for indicator classification
We  used an iterative process of expert judgment to classify
ach indicator in our database in three different ways, which
e summarise in Table 1 and describe at greater length in a
ethodological Appendix A (see the online-only Supplementary
aterial associated with this paper). First, we  categorised each
ndicator according to the Donabedian distinction between struc-
ure, process, and outcome-based approaches to measuring quality
47].
Second, we assessed the dimension of quality being measured
y each indicator, using the ‘dimensions of quality’ framework
rst developed by the Institute of Medicine (IoM) [5] and later
laborated by the World Health Organization and OECD [28,29],
hich added equity to the original IoM dimensions of safety; med-
cal effectiveness; patient-centeredness; timeliness and access; and
fficiency. To these conventional dimensions of quality, our analysis
ed us to conceptualise two further dimensions: ‘well documented’,Non-clinical services: e.g. catering, parking
Management: e.g. finance, administration, and
other oversight functions
for indicators assessing the quality of administrative paperwork,
medical records, and information handover between clinicians; and
‘trained & certified’, for indicators measuring the training and skills
of the hospital workforce.
Finally, we  recorded the particular specialty or part of the
hospital to which each indicator pertained, drawing on the list
of medical specialties across EU member states set out in EU
Directive 2005/36/EC (Annex V) on the recognition of professional
qualifications and including non-clinical support services and man-
agement (see the online-only Supplementary Materials for further
details).
2.4. Coding process
To ensure validity and reliability, each indicator was  coded
in four iterative steps. First, the four authors worked through a
sample of indicators from each country to develop a consistent
understanding of our classification categories. Second, three of the
authors worked together to code each indicator in turn according
to those categories. Third, the corresponding author then repeated
the coding exercise independently. Finally, for the small number
of indicators where conflicts in coding arose, reconciliation was
achieved through in-depth discussion by all four authors until con-
sensus was reached.
2.5. Limitations
Our study has at least three limitations. First, our datasets rep-
resent a snapshot in time. Indicator sets have continued to evolve,
but as we  explain in the ‘Discussion’ and ‘Conclusions’, there are
good reasons to believe that further evolutionary developments
are unlikely to affect the broad patterns of difference we observe
between countries. Second, the process of coding involved a signif-
icant degree of subjectivity. However, that subjectivity is mitigated
by our large N and our reconciliation processes, which increase the
likelihood that even if our classification of any single indicator is
uncertain and contestable, any individual coding errors are likely
to cancel out within such a large dataset. Third, we have restricted
our analysis to the official indicator sets used by the supervisory
organisations charged by law with monitoring the quality of acute




































Numbers of quality indicators used in 2016 by the English CQC, the German B-
GA, the French HAS and the Dutch IGJ disaggregated by Donabedian style, quality
dimension, and hospital activities.
England Germany France Netherlands
Donabedian style
Structure 153 4 39 63
Process 12 119 145 90
Outcome 61 308 76 30
Dimensions of quality
Safety 97 214 55 27
Effectiveness 51 208 23 60
Patient centredness 27 – 49 –
Timeliness 14 3 4 8
Efficiency 22 – – 4
Equity – – – –
Well documented 5 6 123 77
Well certified 10 – 6 7
Hospital department or activity
A&E 12 – – –
Anaesthesia 1 – 17 6
Cardiology 24 148 17 31
Gastroenterology 16 37 – 18
Geriatrics – – – 17
Intensive care (ICU) – – – 6
Nephrology 5 47 6 –
Neurology 9 18 9 12
Obstetrics 4 26 4 4
Oncology 3 8 1 30
Orthopaedics 23 102 – 9
Outpatient care – – 16 –
Paediatrics 5 25 – 19
Psychiatry 4 – 17 –
Rehabilitation – – 22 –
Respiratory medicine 8 17 – 3
Other medical depts 26 – – 2
Hospital-wide 33 3 89 14
Non-clinical services 4 – 9 –04 A.-L. Beaussier et al. / Hea
ospital healthcare in each country. Further research would be
eeded to analyse the various indicators used by other state and
on-state organisations in each of our four case study jurisdic-
ions.
. Results
Supervisory agencies in our four countries each collected data
or hundreds of hospital quality indicators, but not one of 1,100
ndicators in their official sets was concerned with equity, despite
he emphasis given to it in international comparisons of healthcare
ystem performance [5,10,28,29]. Aside from this universal lacuna,
he four national indicator sets differed substantially in their bal-
nce of Donabedian measurement styles, the dimensions of quality
hey considered, and the particular hospital activities they scruti-
ised. Those differences are shown in Table 2 below. We  describe
he distinctive patterns of indicator use in each country in the fol-
owing sub-sections.
.1. England
In England (Fig. 1), the CQC relied on outcome measures (68%),
upplemented by some structure (27%) and process (5%) ones, to
onitor a broad range of quality dimensions and hospital activities.
ndicators were constructed from a huge variety of administrative
ata sources, including patient records, organisational reporting,
omplaints and whistle-blowing logs. Indicators also made use of
urveys; both of patients, to get at patient-centredness, and of staff,
hose responses were used for a variety of structure and process
ndicators, such as the proportion of staff experiencing physical
iolence (COM ABUSESTA in [43]) or judging incident reporting
rocedures to be fair and effective (NHSSTAFF11 in [43]). Hospi-
al standardised mortality rates (HSMRs), which are risk-adjusted
o take account of varying patient mix, provided the CQC with
he vast majority (85%) of its safety indicators. However, HSMRs,
nly provide a plurality (43%) of the many different kinds of
utcomes the CQC monitored, which included emergency read-
ission rates and patient-reported outcome measures of safety
nd medical effectiveness as well as various survey-derived mea-
ures of patient-centredness. This latter quality, along with waiting
Fig. 1. The Donabedian style, quality dimension, and hospital activities monManagement 49 – 53 12
Total number of indicators 226 431 260 18times and the efficiency with which hospitals manage the public
resources provided to them in England’s single-payer healthcare
system, were major concerns for the CQC. Indeed, the CQC had
more indicators devoted to monitoring efficiency and hospitals’
itored by each quality indicator used in 2016 by the English CQC  [43].





































Fig. 2. The Donabedian style, quality dimension, and hospital activities
bility to deliver timely care than our other three countries put
ogether.
CQC indicators provided a synoptic overview of care qual-
ty across the hospital, covering 22 different hospital specialities,
ncluding 10 we combined together as ‘other medical departments’
ecause they were few in number and unique to England. As will
ecome clear below, the scope of English hospital monitoring was
ar wider than in other countries, but also comparatively shal-
ow. Most notably, the CQC’s outcomes-focus tended to preclude
uch scrutiny of the processes of delivering particular kinds of
are. Just two of its 226 indicators measured compliance with best
ractice guidance (‘proportion of patients receiving all secondary
revention medication for which they are eligible’ (MINAP22 in
43]); ‘proportion of cases complying with all nine standards of
are set out by the National Hip Fracture Database’ (NHFD01 in
43]). Rather than auditing clinical governance processes, the CQC
ocused instead on hospital management and on various hospital-
ide indicators of quality, like waiting times, nosocomial infection,
nd re-admission rates, as well as patient satisfaction with non-
linical services, like catering and housekeeping.
.2. Germany
In Germany, hospital quality indicators focused almost entirely
n the safety and medical effectiveness of a few, largely surgical,
nterventions (Fig. 2). The G-BA’s indicator set was  composed
rimarily of outcome measures (71 %). These were derived from
andatory hospital reporting of discrete outcomes from particular
nterventions, such as raw rates of mortality and inability to walk at
ischarge after knee replacement surgery (QI-ID 2277 and 2272 in
45]), rather than from administrative payment data or individual
atient records, which might have been used to risk-adjust mea-
ures of hospital performance by taking account of varying patient
ix. Process indicators focused largely on medical effectiveness
y compliance with best practice guidelines, such as the number
f hip replacement surgeries fulfilling indication criteria (QI-ID
082 in [45]). The G-BA’s handful of structure measures related
o the availability of paediatricians at premature births and delays
etween diagnosis and surgery, reflecting the German concerntored by each quality indicator used in 2016 by the German G-BA [45].
with ensuring clinical excellence [48], rather than efficiency or
patient centredness, which were not otherwise monitored.
This clinical orientation was also reflected in the focus of the
German indicator set on intensively monitoring a limited range
of largely surgical interventions, rather than considering quality
at the broader hospital-level. Indeed, the hospital as an organ-
isational entity hardly figured in the G-BA’s quality monitoring
framework. Over a third (34 %) of its indicators focused on a sin-
gle specialty—cardiology– for which there were 148 indicators
measuring the safety and effectiveness of particular surgical pro-
cedures, such as pacemaker implantation and heart transplants.
Likewise, the focus of orthopaedic, nephrology, and gastroenterol-
ogy indicators was  also on surgical interventions rather than other
kinds of treatment delivered by those specialities. The only non-
surgical quality indicators were for obstetrics and the 17 indicators
for the treatment of community-acquired pneumonia (classified
as ‘respiratory medicine’ in Fig. 2). Beyond these specialties, there
were only 3 indicators for hospital-wide aspects of clinical care,
such as nursing, and no indicators for non-clinical services or hos-
pital management.
3.3. France
In contrast to England and Germany, the French indicator
set consisted of mostly structure and process measures (Fig. 3),
which HAS constructed from hospital reporting and auditing ran-
domly sampled patient files. There were just two clinical outcome
indicators– for post-operative pain-level and autonomy after dis-
charge from stroke (DAN EVA and AVC9 in [44])– and none of the
mortality indicators so common in England and Germany, with
the first HSMR (for myocardial infarction) still under develop-
ment and not set for release until 2020 [49]. Instead, outcome
measures in France were almost entirely concerned with patient
experiences of care, captured through survey questions about, inter
alia, pain relief (E-SATIS29 in [44]), parking (E-SATIS1 in [44]),
and the welcome provided by administrative staff (E-SATIS2 in
[44])). In the absence of objectively measurable indicators of clin-
ical outcomes, safety was  assessed through structural measures of
whether hospitals had appropriate protocols for managing nosoco-
mial infections, while effectiveness was  largely captured through
506 A.-L. Beaussier et al. / Health Policy 124 (2020) 501–510
















Fig. 4. The Donabedian style, quality dimension, and hospital activiti
rocess measures of adherence to protocols for assuring the qual-
ty of care, such as prescription of beta-blockers to heart attack
atients on release from hospital (BBL in [44]). In this way, quality
n France was treated as a function of hospital organisation rather
han the skill of individual clinicians. Indeed, almost half of French
ndicators were process measures of the quality of medical record-
eeping, de facto linking good medical practice to the paperwork
eeded to support the patient journey through the healthcare sys-
em.
This organisational approach to healthcare quality in France was
lso reflected in the emphasis given to monitoring general hospi-
al functions. The majority (67 %) of French indicators focused on
spects of performance across the hospital, including non-clinical
ervices like catering as well as various clinical functions, such as
ain relief, patient rehab, and -most notably- nosocomial infectionnitored by each quality indicator used in 2016 by the Dutch IGJ [46].
control, which was  the subject of more than a quarter of all indi-
cators. However, with just a few exceptions, such as psychiatry,
for which France had many more indicators than any other coun-
try, much less attention was  paid to monitoring individual medical
specialities or interventions.
3.4. Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the IGJ drew exclusively on mandatory
hospital reporting to construct its own  collaboratively designed
indicator set (Fig. 4). The set predominantly comprised process (49
%) and structure (34 %) indicators, many of which, like in France,
focused on the quality of documentation. For the IGJ, however, ‘well
documented’ measured hospital participation in various specialty-
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egistered with the Dutch Spine Surgery Registry (1.5.1 in [46]),
ather than the quality of individual patient records, as in France.
he Dutch principally assessed safety and medical effectiveness
hrough a clinical governance focus on structure and process mea-
ures of adherence to best clinical practice, supplemented by vari-
us patient-reported outcome measures. However, unlike the CQC
nd G-BA, the IGJ indicator set included raw mortality indicators for
ust two interventions, only one of which was then risk-adjusted.
or did the IGJ make use of patient-survey based indicators, which
ere instead collected by the Dutch National Health Care Institute
ZIN) to help patients choose their provider [50].
The IGJ monitored a wide range of services across the hospital.
ith indicators for 13 discrete functions, including two (minimally
nvasive surgeries [1.7.1 in [46]], and diabetic foot ulcers [1.8.1 in
46]]) that we classified under ‘other medical departments’, it was
econd only to the CQC in England in the number of clinical special-
ties it monitored. There were a few indicators about hospital-wide
ssues like nursing care and human resource management, but they
lso had a clinical focus. There were no indicators for non-clinical
ervices and the vast majority (86 %) of indicators focused on the
uality of particular specialties that patients might choose, like in
ermany, rather than on the hospital as an organisational unit, like
n France.
. Discussion
Despite the universal desire to monitor healthcare quality and
ubstantial international efforts to identify and share best practice
n measuring it, our cross-country comparison reveals striking dif-
erences in the official indicator sets used by statutory regulators to
onitor the quality of hospital care in England, Germany, France,
nd the Netherlands.
One way in which official indicator sets differed was in their
se of structure, process, and outcome indicators. Germany stood
ut for almost entirely eschewing structure measures in favour
f outcome and process ones. By contrast, regulators in the other
ountries used all three indicator types more freely, with outcome
ndicators predominating in England, process indicators in France,
nd Dutch indicators evenly divided between Donabedian’s three
tyles of measurement.
Official indicator sets also differed in which dimensions of
uality were monitored and how they were measured. Medical
ffectiveness and safety received universal attention, but apart
rom Germany — which focused almost exclusively on those two
imensions of quality — other countries had various additional
uality concerns as well. Hospital record-keeping accounted for a
hird of Dutch indicators and half of French ones but was  largely
gnored in England. Patient experience was closely monitored by
egulators in France and England but not by their Dutch or German
ounterparts. Likewise, efficiency was a concern in England and to
 lesser extent in the Netherlands, but not in France or Germany.
Even when they monitored the same quality dimensions, reg-
lators often defined and measured them in quite different ways.
or example, more than 90 % of all safety indicators in both England
nd Germany were patient-reported outcomes, which they calcu-
ated in very different ways. While the CQC overwhelmingly relied
n HSMRs, the G-BA measured a broader range of adverse clinical
utcomes but did not standardise them to take account of hospitals’
arying patient mix  and measure relative performance. In contrast
o that outcome-focus, HAS assessed hospital safety in France by
hecking for the existence of clinical protocols to prevent hospital-
cquired infections. The Dutch IGJ measured safety in the most
iverse ways, including: checking the existence of, and compli-
nce with, hospital infection controls and other speciality-specific
afety protocols; measuring patient volumes to ensure surgeons
ere sufficiently practiced to be safe; calculating hospital standard-licy 124 (2020) 501–510 507
ised emergency readmission and complication rates, but almost no
mortality rates.
Official indicator sets also focused on different kinds of hospital
activity. German indicators intensively monitored a small num-
ber of largely surgical interventions, almost completely ignoring
other kinds of medical care or the hospital itself as an organisa-
tion. By contrast, indicators in the other three countries covered a
broader range of clinical specialities and were more concerned with
hospital-wide processes and management. England monitored by
far the widest set of hospital activities, while France was  most
pre-occupied by management of hospital-wide concerns, such as
infection control and catering. The Dutch indicator set was con-
cerned with how well hospital specialists cooperated with various
national disease-based registries to support those registries’ quality
improvement activities.
These findings are consistent with comparative health policy
studies that have highlighted how new policy instruments are
shaped by country-specific demands and constraints of national
healthcare systems and governance traditions, as well as the inter-
ests and veto power of key actors, public preferences, and the
structure of the wider political system [51–53]. Such factors are
likely to create path dependencies in the way that quality indi-
cators are developed and put to use in each country [8,54–56].
We can go further in explaining the nationally specific character
of indicator sets, however, if we  differentiate between ‘demand-
side’ pressures for quality indicators, and ‘supply-side’ constraints
on how indicators can be constructed.
‘Demand-side’ pressures help explain how national indicator
sets ended up targeting such divergent dimensions of quality and
hospital activities as they have responded to the distinctive pol-
icy problems emerging in each country’s healthcare system. Thus,
the indicator set for England’s NHS was synoptic in its coverage
of quality dimensions and hospital activities, because the state
is responsible for everything: funding and delivering healthcare
as well as regulating its quality. In this context, competing pub-
lic demands for safe, speedy, and yet also inexpensive care have
fuelled regular political crises. In response, politicians have charged
the regulator — the CQC — with an ever-expanding list of quality
concerns that its indicators must somehow monitor [9].
By contrast, official indicator sets in Germany, France, and the
Netherlands were less comprehensive in their coverage of quality
dimensions and hospital activities because in those social and pri-
vate insurance systems the state is less immediately accountable
for healthcare and so has left some matters to the healthcare sector.
In Germany, the G-BA is relatively insulated from political pressures
and has, therefore, been slow to expand the narrow scope of its
indicator set, which was  first introduced to prevent providers from
compromising the safety and effectiveness of fixed price surgical
procedures [57]. In France, HAS initially adopted a light touch to
monitoring quality, restricting itself to patient experience surveys
and assessing the quality of paperwork to guard against discon-
tinuities in care by doctors operating in private practice within
French traditions of liberal medicine [58,59]. However, oversight
expanded in 2006 when a public crisis over nosocomial infections
[60,61] prompted the state to develop safety indicators for infec-
tion control, giving France more than three times as many such
indicators as the other countries put together. In the Netherlands,
IGJ indicators have focused more on the clinical effectiveness and
safety of discrete specialities, not least to ensure that the market-
oriented healthcare reforms of 2006, which sought efficiency gains
through managed competition, did not result in a race to the bottom
on quality [62].‘Supply-side’ explanations for indicator variety concern the way
in which the configuration of national healthcare, political, and reg-
ulatory systems constrains the kinds of data that regulators can use
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alance between Donabedian measurement styles in each coun-
ries’ indicator set. Thus, in England’s pluralist political system,
here the state is not bound to secure the agreement of compet-
ng stakeholder interests, the quasi-independent CQC has been free
o construct indicators from the vast quantities of administrative
ata on NHS structures, performance, and patient outcomes that
he state already collects routinely in discharging its responsibility
or both the financing and provision of NHS healthcare. Accord-
ngly the CQC indicator set was wide-ranging and in keeping with
ritish commitments to ‘risk-based’ regulation [9,63], it used z-
coring techniques to highlight hospitals posing the greatest risk to
uality standards, which were defined relatively in terms of statis-
ical deviation from the mean rather than according to any absolute
inimum standards [64].
However, comparable administrative data is less readily avail-
ble in the social and private insurance systems of Germany, France
nd the Netherlands, not least because payment systems vary
etween insurers (despite ongoing efforts to standardise according
o diagnostic-related groups [57]). Consequently, regulators have
ad to negotiate consistent reporting standards with sometimes
eluctant, and often private, providers or otherwise source their
wn data in the face of varying legal and institutional constraints
hat are deeply rooted within their particular political systems and
onstitutional settings.
Thus, in Germany’s fragmented healthcare system indicator
onstruction is highly constrained by both technical data availabil-
ty and political restrictions on its use. Inconsistencies in patient
ecording systems make it difficult to take account of hospitals’
arying patient mix  [57], which is one reason why  mortality and
ther clinical outcome measures are not risk-adjusted, and hospi-
al performance is benchmarked against absolute reference values
ather than relatively as in England. Indicator development is also
onstrained by the federal political system, which makes the 16
tate (Länder) governments — and not the B-GA — responsible for
rganisational aspects of hospital provision that might otherwise
e served by structural indicators. Further constraints are created
y the political need for corporatist consensus, and strong consti-
utional protections of business rights to economic activity [65],
hich open indicator design to legal challenge and were central to
erman hospitals successfully contesting minimum volumes reg-
lation [66].
In France’s centralised pluralist political system, the govern-
ent faces fewer political and constitutional constraints on data
sage, but its fragmented healthcare system has forced HAS to
ollect much of its own indicator data, largely through auditing
atient medical records, mandatory hospital reporting, and patient
urveys. Those data sources have favoured structure and process
easures and a concern with the quality of documentation and
atient experience rather than clinical outcome measures, such as
ortality indicators, which France was slow in developing, because
f medical professional scepticism about unadjusted mortality
ates [60,61]. HAS is currently developing its first HSMR, which is
ow possible thanks to a new database, the Système National des
onnées de Santé (SNDS) [67], which the state is creating to help
ith cost control by linking previously separate payment data with
linical in- and out-patient activity records and a national cause of
eath registry.
In the Netherlands, indicator selection and construction are less
onstrained by the technical challenges of data sourcing and linkage
hat trouble Germany and France, not least because the 2006 health
are reforms required standardisation of payment data to ensure
quitable distribution of the pool of high-risk patients. Rather the
ain constraint has been political insofar as the Dutch corpo-
atist governance tradition means any new indicators must gain the
onsent of the various medical professional and hospital associa-
ions [8]. Process and structure indicators – which account for halflicy 124 (2020) 501–510
and a third of the indicator set respectively— are widely accepted
amongst stakeholders. By contrast, outcome indicators, which are
widely used by clinical registries to support quality improvement
initiatives, account for only a sixth of the official indicators used
by the IGJ. It explains this imbalance by noting that “the reporting
burden on an outcome indicator is much greater than a structure
indicator” [46], but informally it is also clear that the IGJ uses out-
come measures sparingly because their wider utility for regulatory
purposes is not universally accepted [68]. Similarly, the IGJ indica-
tor set does not include any patient survey-based measures because
the patient experience is regarded as more relevant to informing
patient choice — and thus the responsibility of ZIN — than quality
assurance and regulation.
5. Conclusions
Our research on the use of quantitative indicators by health-
care quality regulators in four neighbouring European states shows
that they define, measure, and monitor the quality of acute hospi-
tal care in starkly different ways. However, we  go beyond the banal
observation that countries have their own  ways of doing things,
much like they have different national flags. Rather we argue that
contrasting indicator set designs reflect fundamental differences in
national regulatory priorities, institutional configurations of payers
and providers, and even understandings of quality itself. Although
national indicator sets will continue to evolve, the patterns we
identify here are likely to persist. That path-dependence reflects
distinctive ‘demand-side’ pressures shaping the particular dimen-
sions of quality and hospital activities targeted by national indicator
sets, as well as ‘supply-side’ constraints on data availability and
access shaping the Donabedian measurement styles adopted in
different healthcare and regulatory systems.
Our analysis helps explain why  international efforts to bench-
mark hospital quality and identify universal measures are so
difficult [26,54]. In the absence of universal agreement about
the meaning of quality, countries necessarily steer by their own
lights when selecting quality indicators. Nevertheless, our analy-
sis does suggest that international benchmarking could be made
more tractable by looking for families of countries with similarly
structured healthcare systems and governance traditions, where
supply-side constraints on, and demand-side pressures for, mea-
suring healthcare quality are better aligned.
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